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Pinter v. Dahl: The Supreme Court's Attempt 
to Redefine The "Statutory Seller" Under 
Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 
Section 121 of the Securities Act of 19332 provides that "[a]ny per-
son who offers or sells a security [in violation of Section 5 or Section 
12(2)] shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him . 
. . . "
3 The defendant class, or the class of persons potentially liable 
under this section (commonly known as the "statutory seller") is not 
defined in the Act. As a result, courts have struggled to determine 
whether more indirect sales participants-such as lawyers, accountants, 
and unpaid promoters-can be held liable as statutory sellers under 
Section 12. Over the last few decades, the circuit courts have developed 
three different tests to determine this very question. 
In the 1988 case of Pinter v. Dahl, 4 the Supreme Court rejected 
all three of the circuit court approaches and developed its own test. 
This paper focuses on the meaning and potential impact of the Su-
preme Court's new statutory seller test. Section I of this casenote traces 
the common-law roots of the statutory seller concept and outlines its 
evolution toward today's more expanded interpretation. Section II dis-
cusses the holding of the 1988 Supreme Court ruling in Pinter v. Dahl 
and the new definition of a statutory seller. Section III evaluates the 
Court's holding and determines that lower courts may struggle with 
implementation of the new statutory seller definition with its new mo-
tives-based test. Finally, this casenote concludes that a better definition 
of the defendant class exists that would produce more equitable results 
in Section 12 cases. 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE STATUTORY SELLER CASES 
A. Common-Law Roots 
Section 12 grants a private cause of action to the purchaser of a 
security against "any person who ... offers or sells a security" in viola-
I. The Securities Act of 1933 § 12, IS U.S.C. § 77[ (1982) (hereinafter referred to as Section 
12). 
2. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982) (hereinafter referred to as the 
1933 Act). 
3. IS U.S.C. § 771 (1982). 
4. I 08 S. Ct. 2063 (1988). 
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tion of section 5 or section 12(2). Section 511 requires the filing of a 
registration statement and Section 12(2)6 is an anti-fraud provision. 
The Section 12 cause of action was essentially adapted from the 
common-law right of rescission of contract. 7 At common law, the priv-
ity requirement means that only the immediate seller is liable to his 
purchaser when rescission is granted. Like the common-law action for 
rescission of contract, Section 12 expresses a privity requirement,8 pri-
marily in the words stating that the seller "shall be liable to the person 
purchasing such security from him. "9 This language indicates that the 
drafters of Section 12 contemplated liability for only the immediate 
seller. In addition, the restitution damages granted for violation of Sec-
tion 12 paralleP0 the damages awarded in a common-law action for 
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982) states 
(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for 
any person, directly or indirectly-(!) to make use of any means or instruments of 
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such 
security through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or (2) to carry or 
cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any means or in-
struments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery 
after sale. 
6. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982) states 
Any person who-
(!) offers or sells a security in violation of Section 77e of this title, or 
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section 77c 
of this title, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said section), by the use of 
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce 
or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an 
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order 
to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall 
not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable 
care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person 
purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court 
of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with inter-
est thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such 
security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security. 
7. 3 1. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1700 (2d ed. 1961). ("Section 12(2) can perhaps 
best be analyzed and evaluated by comparing it with common law or equitable rescission, from 
which it was adapted.") 
8. This rescissory nature would limit the liability only to the immediate seller. See Collins v. 
Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113-14 (3d Cir. 1979); Beck v. Cantor, Fitzgerald & Co., 621 F. 
Supp. 1547, 1560-61 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 478 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 975 (1973); Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596, 603 (7th Cir. 1965), 
rev'd on other grounds, 383 U.S. 363 (1966); Abrams, The Scope of Liability Under Section 12 
of the Securities Act of 1933: "Participation" and the Pertinent Legislative Materials, 15 FoRD-
HAM URB. L.J. 877 (1987). 
9. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982) (emphasis added). 
10. Unlike the common-law action for rescission, Section 12 has a fall-back provision that 
allows for "damages if [the purchaser] no longer owns the security." 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982). See, 
1. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1010-1011 (common law rescission al-
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rescission of contract. 11 Hence, any analysis of the Section 12 statutory 
seller definition must include an underlying supposition of privity. 
B. Toward a Broader Definition 
The 1933 Act's failure to effectively define the class of persons 
potentially liable under Section 12 forced courts to construct their own 
definition of a statutory seller. Under the language of the statute a 
transferor is expressly liable as a seller, but the language, as interpreted 
by some lower courts, made it unclear as to whether any other partici-
pants in the transaction could be held liable as a seller. 
In 1939, one U.S. district court held a broker liable under Section 
12, applying simple common-law agency principles.12 The agent was 
placed in the shoes of the principal and held responsible as a statutory 
seller. This approach was widely accepted and it is now a well-estab-
lished rule that a broker or other selling agent, acting for a principal, 
can be considered a seller under Section 12.18 
C. Three Different Tests 
Most courts did not stop at the broker level. Many courts contin-
ued to expand the statutory seller definition to include many other par-
ticipants in the securities transaction. 14 Three different lines of author-
ity were created that expanded the statutory seller definition. Each line 
of cases established a different test to determine the requisite relation-
ship of collateral participants to the transaction necessary to impose 
primary liability status under Section 12. The tests are called: (1) the 
participation test, (2) the proximate cause test, and (3) the participant 
position test. 
The three tests, created to determine the definition of a statutory 
seller, were established in the 1960's. In most of the cases, lower courts 
cited the Supreme Court's application of the 1933 Act, claiming that it 
should be broadly construed "to effectuate its remedial purposes.m5 
The language of the statute was almost completely ignored and only the 
lows for no recovery when the plaintiff has disposed of the contract property). 
11. L. Loss, at 1010-1011 (1983) ("In rescission there is no problem of computing damages. 
Either the P can restore the defendant to the status quo ante or he has no action of rescission at 
all .... ") 
12. Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939), affd, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940). 
13. Pinter, 108 S. Ct. at 2078. 
14. In the Third Circuit, however, strict privity was required absent control. Collins v. 
Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113 (3rd Cir. 1979). Also see cases cited in note 8, supra. 
15. Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). 
See generally, L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION J-54, 1007-56 (1983). 
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protection of the potential investor was considered. 
1. The participation test 
One line of cases adopted a test that measures a third party's par-
ticipation in the events leading up to the sale. 16 This participation test 
is the broadest of the three tests, allowing primary liability under Sec-
tion 12 for all who participate in the sale.17 The second circuit is the 
only circuit court that has applied this test. In Katz v. Amos Treat & 
Co., 18 the court held that a strict reading of the privity requirement in 
the statutory seller definition was contrary to the "remedial purpose of 
the statute."19 Any solicitation,20 even without compensation, would 
bring a participant into the action and possibly within liability of the 
statute: "[I]t was thus clear error for the court to have dismissed the 
complaint against [the participants to the transaction] all of whom . 
pressed [the purchaser] to buy ... stock."21 
2. The proximate cause test 
The fifth circuit rejected the participation test as being overly 
broad and created its own test,22 borrowing the doctrine of proximate 
cause from common-law tort theory. Under the proximate cause test, 
anyone who participated in the transaction could be considered a statu-
tory seller, but only if that participation was determined to be a sub-
stantial factor in causing the transaction to take place.23 As contrasted 
with the participation test, the proximate cause test limits potential Sec-
tion 12 liability to only those who participate in some substantial way. 
The fifth circuit, in Hill York Corp. v. American International 
Franchises, Inc., 24 described the test in the following terms: "[T]he line 
16. O'Hara, Erosion of the Privity Requirement in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 
1933: The Expanded Meaning of Seller, 31 UCLA L. REv. 921, 948-58 (1984). 
17. Wonneman v. Stratford Securities Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '11 90,923 (S.D.N.Y. 
1959); Wonneman v. Stratford Securities Co., Fee;. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '11 91,034 (S.D.N.Y. 
1961). 
18. 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969). 
19. !d. at 1052. 
20. Compare notes 42-56 and accompanying text as to the similarities of the new solicitation 
test established by Pinter v. Dahl. 
21. Katz, 411 F.2d at 1053 (emphasis added). 
22. Hill York Corp. v. Am. lnt'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971). The Fifth 
Circuit test seems to have been accepted by several other circuits. See Davis v. Avco Financial 
Services, Inc., 739 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1984); Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, (9th Cir. 
1982); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, (8th Cir. 1981); Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283 (4th 
Cir. 1978); Ayers v. Wofinbarger, 491 F.2d 8 (5th Cir 1974). 
23. Hill York Corp v. Am. lnt'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971). O'Hara, 
supra note 16, at 958-74. 
24. 448 F.2d at 693 (citing Lennereth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59, 65 (N.D. Ohio 
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of demarcation must be drawn in terms of cause and effect: To borrow 
a phrase from the law of negligence, did the injury to the plaintiff flow 
directly and proximately from the actions of this particular defend-
ant?"211 The proximate cause test is a participation test limited by com-
mon law tort principles of causation. 
3. The participant position test 
The eighth circuit developed its own definition for statutory 
seller.26 Under the participant position test, primary liability as a seller 
depends on the position of the participant at the time of the transaction. 
If the participant was in a position to ensure full disclosure of the ma-
terial facts, then that participant is a seller under Section 12.27 
In Wasson v. SEC, 28 the eighth circuit focused on the goal of full 
disclosure that the Supreme Court declared in Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder. 29 Because it is the "crucial step in the Act's disclosure 
scheme,"30 the point of sale is where the court should ask "whether the 
defendant was uniquely positioned to ask relevant questions, acquire 
material information, or disclose his findings."31 
D. Back to the Language of the Statute 
The tests expand the statutory seller definition beyond the express 
language of the statute, using elements from various areas of common 
law. While each test is supported by equitable and logical arguments, 
as well as by judicial opinion, all three disregard the strict privity re-
quirement established in the express language of the statute. 32 
Early in the 1980's, the Supreme Court's attitude toward the se-
curities laws changed. Instead of concentrating on the Act's broad re-
medial purpose, the Court placed renewed emphasis on the language of 
the securities acts and more narrowly construed the language of those 
1964) ("The hunter who seduces the prey and leads it to the trap he has set is no less guilty than 
the hunter whose hand springs the snare.")). 
25. 448 F.2d at 693. 
26. See, O'Hara, supra note 16, at 974-79. See, e.g., Jeffries & Co. v. United Missouri 
Bank, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1l 99,257, at 96,140 (W.D. Mo. 
May 24, 1983); Lingenfelter v. Title Ins. Co. of Minnesota, 442 F. Supp. 981, 992-93 (D. Neb. 
1977). 
27. Wasson v. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, 558 F.2d 879, 886 (8th Cir. 1977). This approach has 
apparently been followed in only a few cases outside the Eighth Circuit. 
28. 558 F.2d 879, 886 (1977). 
29. 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (The Supreme Court focused on the goal of full disclosure and 
the Act's "broad remedial purpose."). 
30. Wasson, 558 F.2d at 886. 
31. /d. 
32. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text. 
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statutes.33 As the transformation of the rules of interpretation began to 
take place, lower courts followed the Supreme Court's lead in searching 
the language of the statutes for guidance rather than relying merely on 
the remedial purposes of the Acts. Commentators also began attacking 
the case law for its abuse of the strict language of the statutes.34 Finally 
in 1988, the Supreme Court gave the lower courts further guidance for 
construing Section 12 liability when it decided Pinter v. Dahl. 8~ 
II. Pinter v. Dahl 
A. Factual Background86 
Pinter is an oil and gas producer and a registered security dealer. 
Dahl is a real estate broker and investor who was a veteran of two 
unsuccessful oil and gas ventures. Dahl advanced money to Pinter to 
acquire oil and gas leases, while retaining the right of first refusal to 
drill. The leases were to be held, however, in the name of Pinter's 
Black Gold Oil Company. Pinter acquired the leases and worked 
closely with Dahl. After investing in the properties, Dahl told his 
friends, family and business associates about the venture. Because of 
Dahl's involvement, others decided to invest. Dahl assisted his fellow 
investors in completing the subscription agreement form prepared by 
Pinter, but never received any commissions.37 
Upon failure of the venture, those who had invested brought suit 
against Pinter for rescission of the investment contract under Section 
12( 1) of the Securities Act. 38 In a counterclaim Pinter alleged, inter 
alia, that Dahl should be liable for contribution because Dahl had 
agreed to raise the funds and Pinter was merely an "operating 
agent."39 Pinter also claimed the defense of in pari delicto against 
Dahl. The District Court considered these defenses40 and then, in de-
ciding whether Dahl was liable for contribution, considered whether 
Dahl was himself a "seller" of the oil and gas interests within the 
33. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). 
34. See generally, Kaminsky, An Analysis of Securities Litigation Under Section 12(2) and 
How It Compares with Rule JOb-5, 13 Hous. L. REv. 231 (1976); O'Hara, supra note 16; 
Abrams, supra note 8. 
35. 108 S. Ct. 2063 (1988). 
36. /d. at 2067-70. 
37. /d. at 2067-68. 
38. /d. at 2068. 
39. /d. at 2068-69. 
40. This case note will not deal with the first part of the holding which considered the in 
pari delicto defense. The Court held that there is a defense of in pari delicto in the case of Section 
12 even though scienter is not involved. However, the Court remanded this case for further facts 
as to who was responsible for failure to register the securities. /d. at 2075. 
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meaning of Section 12(1 ). The lower court declined to impose liability 
on Dahl because the court found no evidence that Dahl sought or re-
ceived any financial benefit in return for "mere gregariousness."·u 
B. Analysis and Holding 
The Supreme Court42 began its analysis of what constitutes a 
seller for the purposes of Section 12(1) by examining the language of 
the statute!3 The Court noted that the buyer-seller relationship con-
templated by Section 12, which is "not unlike traditional contractual 
privity,"44 would, at the very least, impose liability on the owner who 
passes title. 
The Court then looked to the statutory definitions and found that 
the definition of the word offer., included the term "solicitation of an 
offer to buy ... a security ... for value."46 The Court noted that under 
this definition: 
[T]he range of persons potentially liable under § 12( 1) is not limited 
to persons who pass title. The inclusion of the phrase "solicitation of 
an offer to buy" within the definition of "offer" brings an individual 
who engages in solicitation, an activity not inherently confined to the 
actual owner, within the scope of § 12.47 
The Court concluded that this definitional inclusion of the term solici-
tation expands the meaning of the words offers and sells to include 
more persons than simply the transferor of title!8 
41. Pinter, at 2070. 
42. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, O'Connor, and Scalia joined. Justice Kennedy took no 
part in the consideration or decision of the case. Justice Stevens dissented on other grounds, stating 
[T]he discussion of the § 12(a) term "seller" in the context of a contribution suit is both 
advisory, because no such suit was brought in this case, and misleading, because it 
assumes that the class of persons who sell securities to purchasers (i.e., §12(1) "sell-
ers") is coextensive with the class of potential defendants in claims for contribution, not 
brought directly under § 12(1 ), asserted by § 12( 1) sellers. 
Pinter, 108 S. Ct. at 2083. 
43. Id. at 207S (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 42S U.S. 18S, 197 (1976)). 
44. Pinter, 108 S. Ct. at 207S-76. 
4S. IS U.S.C. § 77b states; 
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(3) The term "sale" or "sell" shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a 
security or interest in a security, for value. The term "offer to sell", "offer for sale", or 
"offer" shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to 
buy, a security or interest in a security, for value .... 
IS U.S.C. §77b (1982) (emphasis added). 
46. Pinter, 108 S. Ct. at 2076; 1S U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1982). 
47. Pinter, 108 S. Ct. at 2076 (emphasis added). 
48. ld. 
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In considering which other sales participants might be statutory 
sellers, the Court first recognized the long-established precedent that a 
seller/ agent is liable under the Act. 49 The Court then explained the 
1954 Amendment to the 1933 Act and its effect on Section 12: "As 
enacted in 1933, §12(1) imposed liability on '[a]ny person who sells a 
security .... '"110 In the 1954 Amendments, the phrase was changed 
to "[a]ny person who offers or sells a security .... " The change in 
wording was made because the original definition of sell, in the defini-
tion section of the Act,111 was split into two separate definitions of sell 
and offer. 112 
Since "sells" and "purchases" have obvious correlative meanings, 
Congress' express definition of "sells" in the original Securities Act to 
include solicitation suggests that the class of those from whom the 
buyer "purchases" extended to persons who solicit him. The 1954 
amendment to § 12(1) was intended to preserve existing law .... 
Hence, there is no reason to think Congress intended to narrow the 
meaning of "purchased from" when it amended the statute to include 
"solicitation" in the statutory definition of "offer" alone. 53 
The Court then determined that the test must be ( 1) whether there 
was actually a buyer-seller relationship in terms of common-law privity 
or (2) whether there was another party who participated in the trans-
action in a way that would be considered solicitation, which seemed to 
include some financial gain component.114 
The Court recognized that liability extends only to a person "who 
successfully solicits the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire 
to serve his own financial interests or those of the securities owner."1111 
Hence, the court imposed an undefined motivation factor on the solici-
tation test. The Court expanded very little on this point, but the opin-
ion seemed to indicate that the motive of the soliciting participant is a 
material factual question left to the fact-finder to decide when defining 
a statutory seller. 116 
49. ld. at 2077. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
50. Pinter, at 2077 (emphasis added). 
51. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1982). This is the definition section of the 1933 Act. 
52. The statute does not define the word purchase, but the word "should be interpreted in a 
manner complementary to sale which is defined in § 2(3) .... " Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Guild 
Films Co., 279 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir ), cert. denied sub nom.; Santa Monica Bank v. SEC, 364 
U.S. 819 (1960). 
53. Pinter, 108 S. Ct. at 2077-78 (emphasis added) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1542, 83d Cong., 
2d Sess., 26 (1954); S. REP. No. 1036, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1954)). 
54. ld. at 2078. 
55. ld. at 2079. 
56. ld. at 2082. Even though the District Court made a specific finding that "Dahl solicited 
each of the other plaintiffs," the Court stated 
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The Court then considered the other statutory seller tests that had 
been established by the lower courts117 and quickly rejected all three of 
the circuit courts' statutory seller tests because they were not faithful to 
the language of the statute. 118 Lastly, the Court remanded the case for 
the lower court's determination of whether Dahl had solicited each of 
the other plaintiffs in connection with the offer, purchase, and receipt 
of their oil and gas interests for his own benefit.119 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE Pinter Decision 
A. The New Solicitation Test 
The new solicitation test is not significantly different from the ear-
lier tests established by the lower courts. In Pinter, the definition of a 
statutory seller has been expanded beyond the buyer-seller relationship 
contemplated in the statute. The privity requirement has again been 
abandoned, but this time in favor of a solicitation test. 
The Court failed to define the term solicit, stating only that the 
solicitor must benefit in some pecuniary way. Consequently, the lower 
courts will struggle with this new word, and, as they did with the word 
seller, try to create some manageable test to determine whether a per-
son is a solicitor. The door is again open to the interpretational abuse 
of the statutory seller cases of the past. The artful pleader will merely 
allege solicitation instead of participation, proximate cause or position. 
B. Interpreting Securities Statutes 
Courts generally use a four-step approach when interpreting a 
statute and this process is applied in the securities field as well. A court 
first looks at the explicit language of the statute to determine its 
bounds.80 The second step involves consideration of the legislative his-
tory of the statute.81 The court finds further clarification by considering 
It is not clear, however, that Dahl had the kind of interest in the sales that make him 
liable as a statutory seller .... The Court of Appeals apparently concluded that Dahl 
was motivated entirely by a gratuitous desire to share an attractive investment opportu-
nity with his friends and associates .... This conclusion, in our view, was premature." 
/d. at 2082-83. (the District Court made no such findings.) 
57. See supra notes 15-31 and accompanying text. 
58. Pinter, 108 S. Ct. at 2079-82. 
59. /d. at 2082-83. See Dahl v. Pinter, 857 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1988) (The Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for findings consistent with the Su-
preme Court's holding as described above). 
60. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976); Aaron v. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, 
446 U.S. 680 (1980). 
61. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201. 
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the particular statute in light of the whole regulatory scheme.62 Finally, 
if the first three steps lead to two equally plausible interpretations of 
the same statute, then the court looks at the policies and purposes un-
derlying that statute.63 
1. The explicit language of section 12( 1) 
"The starting point in every case involving construction of a stat-
ute is the language itself."64 In Aaron v. SEC, 66 the Supreme Court 
even sought guidance from Webster's New International Dictionary as 
a tool for understanding words that had not been specifically defined by 
the statute. 66 
While it is true that Congress enacted the securities statutes with a 
broad remedial purpose, they did not intend to provide a "broad federal 
remedy for all fraud."67 The allegedly unlawful conduct must be pro-
hibited by the language of a particular statute. 
The express language of Section 12(1) states, "Any person who 
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of [Section 5] ... shall be liable 
to the person purchasing such security from him .... "68 While the 
term offer in the first clause may contemplate an offer without relation 
to a sale, the latter clause, "purchasing such security from him," ex-
pressly restricts the case to a purchase and the remedy of rescission 
permits recovery only from the actual seller.69 However, in Pinter, the 
Court looked at the word offer, found the word solicitation in its defi-
nition, and stopped there. The Court failed to consider the important 
phrase of "purchasing such security from him,"70 which expressly lim-
its the defendant class to the seller or transferor. 
62. See, Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969). 
63. See, Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 694-95 n.7 (1985). 
64. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); See, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 350 (1941). 
65. 446 U.S. 680 (1980). 
66. /d. at 696 n.13. 
67. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982) (citations omitted). 
68. 15 U.S.C. § 771 ( 1982) (emphasis added). 
69. Courts generally agree that a sale is required in order to maintain a Section 12 cause of 
action. See, e.g., Bosse v. Crowell Collier & MacMillan, 565 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1977); Thomas v. 
Roblin Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1975); Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th 
Cir. 1973); Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967); Surowitz v. Hilton 
Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 383 U.S. 363 (1966); Mone-
tary Management Group of St. Louis, Inc. v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 604 F.Supp. 764 (E.D. 
Mo. 1985); Nick v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 15 (D. Minn. 1984); Am. Nursing 
Care of Toledo, Inc. v. Leisure, 609 F. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Glusband v. Fittin Cun-
ningham Lauzon, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
70. 15 U.S.C. § (1982). The Court merely interpreted the second phrase as requiring a 
purchase, rather than requiring privity. Pinter, at 2077. 
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The 1933 Act does not define the word purchase, but there is an 
obvious relationship between purchase and the words sell and sold. 71 
The same relationship, however, does not exist between the words 
purchase and offer. The Supreme Court, in Blue Chips Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 72 distinguished a completed sale from prior activi-
ties that may lead to a sale.73 Thus it seems that the inclusion of the 
word offer in Section 12 is at odds with the qualification of "person 
purchasing such security from him."74 
The use of the word offer in Section 12 poses a curious question: 
How can the word offer apply if the second phrase limits this action to 
only those who purchase, and rescission is the remedy? 
Perhaps Congress intended the definition of seller to be expanded 
as it has been, and that is why the word offer was added to Section 12 
in the 1954 Amendments after the word offer was eliminated from the 
definition of sell. That is apparently what the Supreme Court con-
cluded in Pinter. 75 Unfortunately, the legislative history is limited on 
this section and does not address this issue. 76 
The better explanation of the inclusion of the word offer is that 
when the 1954 Amendments eliminated the word offer from the defini-
tion of sell, Congress merely added the words offers or, on a wholesale 
basis, wherever the word sells previously appeared. Even the Pinter 
Court recognizes that "[ t ]he 19 54 amendment to § 12( 1) was intended 
to preserve existing law, including the liability provisions of the Act."77 
If this explanation holds true, the interpretation of the Supreme Court, 
expanding the seller definition, is erroneous.78 In fact, the only purpose 
71. Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485, 489 (2d. Cir. 1960). See also 1 L. 
Loss, supra note 7, at 548. 
72. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
73. !d. at 725, 731, 734 
74. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982). 
75. 108 S. Ct. at 2077-78. 
7 6. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. 
77. Pinter, 108 S. Ct. at 2078. See H. R. REP. No. 1542, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1954); S. 
REP. No. 1036, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1954). 
78. But see, 3 L. Loss supra note 6, at 1703-04. Loss argues that there is some reason to 
view Section 12(1) and 12(2) differently, and he suggests a purpose for the addition of the words 
offers or, but seems to limit that purpose to the context of Section 12(2) 
!d. 
Yet it does not seem necessary to follow here the categorical § 12(1) approach which 
grounds liability on an illegal offer followed by a legal sale. In § 12( 1) there is no 
alternative to that reading except to disregard both the addition of the words "offers or" 
in 1954 and the general realization that there is often no other effective sanction for 
"beating the gun." But it is possible in §12(2) to give meaning to both phrases-"offers 
or" and "by means of' -by grounding liability on the use of a misleading prospectus or 
other document which was corrected before the sale .. 
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of the inclusion of the word offer was to "preserve existing law."79 
The word solicitation is contained in the Section 2(3) definition of 
the word offer and the word offer is in Section 12. Notwithstanding, 
there is a justification for not interpreting the Section 2(3) definition in 
the way that the Supreme Court did in Pinter. The definitions in Sec-
tion 2(3) of the 1933 Act are prefaced with the qualification "unless the 
context otherwise requires."80 While the term offer does include the 
word solicitation, perhaps this is an instance where the context ex-
pressly requires otherwise. 81 The context of Section 12 liability re-
quires privity between buyer and seller, and the word offer, including 
the use of the word solicitation, infringes on this requirement. The 
scope of Section 12 liability is limited to only those situations of actual 
privity,82 and any construction of the definitions that expands the scope 
of Section 12 would be a case in which the context does otherwise 
require. 
2. The legislative history of Section 12 
To aid in the task of interpreting the express language of the stat-
ute, courts look to the relevant legislative history.83 By reviewing the 
history of the congressional process, the courts can better interpret the 
purposes of the acts of Congress.84 Although difficult, determining leg-
islative intent is the task of the judiciary.815 
In this case, the applicable legislative history is silent on the issue 
of the statutory seller problem. The legislative history of the Securities 
Act of 1933 contains only two excerpts concerning Section 12, and 
neither tends to support one reading of the statute more than another. 86 
79. Pinter, 108 S. Ct. at 2078. 
80. 15 u.s.c. § 77b (1982). 
81. Id. See also, O'Hara, supra note 16, at 941. 
82. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text. 
83. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201. 
84. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. 
85. See Abrams, supra note 8, at 921. See also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 
472 (1977) (where the language or the statute is surriciently clear in context, the language controls 
and there is no need to search the legislative history). 
86. See, O'Hara, supra note 16, at 992, n. 387 
The House Committee Report discusses civil liability under § 12(2) in only two 
instances. At first blush the initial rererence might appear to support a concept or par-
ticipant liability. However, on closer reading it becomes clear that this language is 
attributable to the ract that the Report was discussing § 11 and § 12 in the conjunctive 
under the general heading or "Civil Liabilities," and that the references to participant 
liability refer only to actions under § 11. 
H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1933) states 
Sections 11 and 12 create and derine the civil liabilities imposed by the act and the 
machinery ror their enrorcement which renders them practically valuable. Fundamen-
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It is well accepted, however, that Section 12 was adapted from common 
law rescission.87 That proposition lends great support to a narrow 
reading of the statute, in which privity would be a prerequisite to the 
imposition of liability. 
3. The federal regulatory scheme 
The third step of statutory interpretation is the consideration of 
the entire regulatory scheme of which the statute is a part.88 "[T]he 
interdependence of the various sections of the securities laws is certainly 
a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language Congress has 
chosen .... " 89 This is especially relevant when the statute is incor-
porated within an elaborate statutory scheme such as the securities 
laws. 
The legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts is sparse, at best. 
In viewing the statutory language of Section 12, a portion of the legis-
lative intent can be surmised simply by viewing the individual statute 
as a part of the whole act.90 The construction of the securities acts is 
viewed in whole, because in the absence of contrary intent, the legisla-
ture is presumed to have intended that an act be interpreted as a uni-
fied whole. 91 
In Pinter, the Court extended liability to a solicitor, using a statu-
tory reading of the definitions, and included as part of its analysis an 
tally, these sections entitle the buyer of securities sold upon a registration statement 
including an untrue statement or omission of material fact, to sue for recovery of his 
purchase price, or for damages not exceeding such price, those who have participated in 
such distribution either knowing of such untrue statement or omission or having failed 
to take due care in discovering it. The duty of care to discover varies in its demands 
upon participants in security distribution with the importance of their place in the 
scheme of distribution and with the degree of protection which the public has a right to 
expect .... 
The Committee emphasizes that these liabilities attach only when there has been an 
untrue statement of a material fact or an omission to state a material fact in the regis-
tration statement or the prospectus-the basic information by which the public is solic-
ited. All who sell securities with such a flaw, who cannot prove that they did not 
know-or who in the exercise of due care could not have known-of such misstatement 
or omission, are liable under [S]ections 11 and 12. 
It becomes apparent from the language that the participant liability spoken of is 
tied only to Section 11 and not to Section 12. 
87. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text. 
88. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 206; Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Nat'l Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 
466 (1969). 
89. Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Nat'l Sec., 393 U.S. at 466. 
90. See, Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 112-14 (1978); Ernst & Ernst, 425 
U.S. at 206-11. 
91. Abrams, supra note 8, at 903 n.143, (citing 2A j. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STAT-
UTORY CoNSTRUCTION §§ 46.05, 46.06, 47.01 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1984)). 
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equity argument: "[I]t is fair to say that the buyer 'purchased' the se-
curity from [the solicitor] and to align [the solicitor] with the owner in 
a rescission action."92 In light of the statutory scheme established by the 
1933 and 1934 Acts, the equity spoken of here is superfluous. Those 
soliciting participants are held liable under other statutes93 and to in-
clude them as sellers in this case is not necessary in order to establish 
liability. 
Section 106 of the 1934 Act94 is most susceptible to dilution be-
cause of the liberal reading of Section 12. In a footnote, 911 the Pinter 
Court expressly denied the application of its decision to Section 12(2), 
even though "[m]ost courts and commentators have not defined the de-
fendant class differently for purposes of the two provisions."96 The lan-
guage of Section 12(2) is identical to the language of Section 12(1) in 
92. Pinter, 108 S. Ct. at 2079. 
93. Other statutes establish liability for participants. See, e.g., Section JOb of the 1934 Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1982) (extending liability to "any person"); Section 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1982) 
(extending liability to "any person" acting with any of a number of stated purposes); Section 11, 
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982) (extending liability to the issuer and every other person who signed the 
registration statement, the issuer's principal officers and its directors or partners, persons named 
with their consent in the registration statement as being or about to become directors or partners, 
persons named with their consent as experts, and every underwriter); Section 17, 15 U.S.C. § 
77q(a) (1982) (extending liability to "any person" who violates the statute). See also the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 (1982) (extending liability to persons who, for 
compensation, engage in the business of advising others, either directly, through publications or 
writing, concerning the value of securities or advising investment in, or purchasing or selling of 
securities). 
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (hereinafter referred to as Section JO(b)). Section JO(b) 
provides 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ... (b) To use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities 
exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors. 
The SEC then promulgated Rule lOb-S, in 1942, that is codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987) 
which states 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or, 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. Section 240.1 Ob-5. 
95. Pinter, 108 S. Ct. at 2076 n.20. 
96. Id. 
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its definition of the defendant class.97 Moreover, the only distinction 
between the two sections is that Section 12( 1) deals with violations of 
section S registration statements while Section 12(2) is an anti-fraud 
provision. 
According to the holding in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 98 the 
first step to interpreting the securities acts is to look to the language of 
the statute. The second step would be to look at the legislative history 
to determine intent.99 The language of Sections 12(1) and 12(2) is iden-
tical, and even contained in the same subsection. There is no justifica-
tion for the Supreme Court to interpret these two subsections differ-
ently, especially in light of the identical legislative history of the two 
subsections. In either case, the liability granting clause is the same and, 
if the language of the statute is given the same interpretation, it would 
pose some interesting problems for the Court. 
Section 12(2) is an anti-fraud provision which uses language simi-
lar to that of Rule 10b-S. 100 Under Rule lOb-S, the plaintiff is required 
to prove reliance101 as well as (and perhaps more importantly) scien-
ter.102 However, Rule lOb-S does not limit the defendant class and that 
is the purpose of the requirement of reliance and scienter. This burden 
of proving reliance and scienter is significant103 and many plaintiffs' 
lawyers try to use Section 12(2) to avoid such a burden. 104 Under Sec-
tion 12(2), the plaintiff has a cause of action that is basically one of 
strict liability. There is no burden of showing reliance1011 or scienter.106 
Section 12(2) imposes liability on a seller for negligence without reli-
ance, a much lesser burden than Rule 1 Ob-S.107 
If the Court's interpretation of the language of Section 12 is ap-
plied to Section 12(2) (which is proper because the language is the 
same), then the cause of action under Rule lOb-S will be greatly di-
luted. Plaintiffs will bring, and win, causes of action for mere negli-
97. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982) ("Any person who-(!) offers or sells a security ... shall be 
liable to the person purchasing such security from him .... "). 
98. 425 U.S. at 197 (1976). 
99. /d. at 201. 
100. Compare notes 6 and 94 supra and accompanying text. 
101. See 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITif:S FRAUD AND CoMMODITIES 
FRAUD§ 8.6(1) (1983). But see, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 
(1972). 
102. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193-94. 
103. 3 L. Loss, supra note 7, at 17 63-97. 
104. Kaminsky, supra note 34, at 231. 
105. Wigand v. Flo-Tek, Inc., 609 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir. 1980); Alton Box Bd. Co. v. 
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916, 923 (8th Cir. 1977). 
106. Franklin Sav. Bank of N.Y. v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 526-29 (2d Cir. 1977). 
107. For a complete comparison between Section 12(2) and Rule !Ob(5) see 3 A. BROMBERG 
& L. LowENFELS, supra note 101, at § 8.4-8.6 (1983); 3 L. Loss, supra note 7, at 1702-04. 
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gence without reliance against those that Rule lOb-S was designed to 
encompass. The additional hurdle of privity would be absent and the 
new solicitation test, if applied to Section 12(2), could dramatically di-
lute the cause of action under Rule lOb-5. 108 
4. Policy considerations 
When a court has examined a statute's language, its legislative his-
tory, and the regulatory scheme, it has exhausted its interpretive pow-
ers, even in the case of a remedial statute. 109 However, the Supreme 
Court has stated that "it is proper for a court to consider ... policy 
considerations in construing terms in [statutory construction of Securi-
ties Acts]. " 110 
The Pinter Court stated, as one policy consideration, that its deci-
sion "furthers the purposes of the Securities Act-to promote full and 
fair disclosure of information to the public in the sales of securities."111 
The solicitation stage may be the most critical to the flow of informa-
tion and perhaps the stage at which the investor is most likely to be 
injured. 112 Also, brokers and other solicitors are in perhaps the best 
position to control the flow of information.113 
These policy considerations, however, do not give the Court reason 
to "infer that Congress intended solicitation to fall under the mantle of 
§ 12(1)."114 Policy considerations are generally used in securities cases 
only in the event of two equally credible interpretations of the statute. 
When the language of the statute, the legislative intent and the statu-
tory construction are ambiguous and permit two equally plausible in-
terpretations, then policy considerations can swing the balance one way 
or the other. 1111 In a Section 12 case, the language of the statute and its 
history are absolute and these policy arguments cannot alter that con-
clusiveness. Policy considerations are not an issue in a Section 12 case. 
108. A comparison of Section 11 with Section 12 provides a similar result in that Section 11 
is also greatly diluted by the expanded seller definition of Section 12. 
109. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 727-36. 
110. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681,694-95 n.7 (1985). 
111. Pinter, 108 S. Ct. at 2078. 
112. /d. 
113. Id. 
114. !d. 
115. See, Abrams, supra note 8, at 911-22. See also Blue Chips Stamps, 421 U.S. at 727-37 
n.8 (the majority refused to accept Justice Blackmun's policy arguments in the face of the lan-
guage of the statute). 
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C. Agency Theory May Be the Explanation 
Courts and commentators agree that the transferor of title is con-
sidered a seller under Section 12.116 They also agree, for the most part, 
that an agent may be considered a seller under certain agency princi-
pals.117 The Pinter Court seems to stretch this exception beyond agency 
to solicitation. This casenote has argued that the solicitation test is an 
improper tool for determining whether a party to a security transaction 
is a seller. 
Perhaps the new solicitation test established by the Court is meant 
to extend liability only in the event of a de facto principal/agent rela-
tionship. The Court's test even suggests that commissions, or other 
monetary gain, are an element of the solicitation test. 118 As justification 
for its solicitation test, the Court stated that "[t]here is authority at 
common law ... for granting a plaintiff rescission against a defendant 
who was not a party to the contract in question, in particular, against 
the agent of the vendor."119 
It seems that the only real justification for the test is a principal/ 
agent relationship under common-law principals of agency. However, if 
that is the objective of the Supreme Court, then such a mandate should 
be explicitly stated. By using a new test that has yet to be interpreted 
by lower courts, the Supreme Court has left the issue open to the lower 
courts to expand liability, rather than limiting the lower courts with the 
established doctrine of agency. 120 However, if the principal/agent the-
ory is adopted by the lower courts, the commentators and the court will 
be in agreement on the question of liability under Section 12. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Pinter Court was faced with a doctrine of law that was full of 
conflicts in the lower federal courts, and replete with overly-expansive 
tests. The Court reconciled the lower courts with an initial approach of 
using the language of the statute, which was absolutely correct. The 
application of statutory construction, however, was misused. The Court 
failed to consider the entire statute and applied a definition that per-
116. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text. 
117. See generally, 3 L. Loss, supra note 7, at 1715; W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw 
OF AGENCY§ 130(B) (1964). 
118. See supra note 56. 
119. Pinter, 108 S. Ct. at 2079 n.23 (emphasis added). 
120. To date, most cases applying Pinter can be reconciled using an agency theory. See, e.g., 
Schlinke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935 (7th Cir. 1989); Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473 (2nd 
Cir. 1988); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988); Laven v. Flanagan, 695 
F.Supp. 800 (D. NJ 1988) (interpreting Pinter test as agency only with little emphasis on solici-
tation); In re Prorl Fin. Management, Ltd., 692 F.Supp. 1057 (D. Minn. 1988). 
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haps was unfounded and unnecessary. An application of simple agency 
theory would have yielded an appropriate result without opening the 
doors to lower court interpretation. Now, the resulting interpretation of 
this new test by the lower courts, with their propensity to expand lia-
bility as demonstrated in past cases, may lead to even more confusion 
and conflict. The Pinter decision may also lead to increased dilution of 
the other sections within the 1933 and the 1934 Act, especially Rule 
10b-5. If the Court wanted to establish a simple agency theory in this 
case, it should have been explicit with such a mandate so that the Court 
could better predict the administration of the rule in the lower courts. 
Allen Kent Davis 
